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Edmund S. Phelps 
Much has been written by historians and sociologists as well as business 
commentators about the modern economy—the kind that supplanted the 
traditional economy in several nations in the nineteenth century and many 
more in the latter half of the twentieth century. The pre-capitalist system 
dominated by the self-employed and the self-ﬁnanced gave way to ﬁnance 
capitalism. To call this a “great transformation” was no overstatement. 
A traditional economy is one of routine. In the usual illustrative exam­
ple, rural folk periodically exchange their produce for the goods of the 
town. The sole disturbances are not of their doing and are beyond their 
control—rainfall, temperature, and other exogenous shocks. This was the 
economy modeled in the neoclassical theory of economic equilibrium from 
Ricardo and B¨ ohm-Bawerk to Walras and Samuelson. It is also the econ­
omy described in the subsequent stochastic models of “rational expectations 
equilibrium” in the face of shocks that were pioneered by Arrow, Samuelson, 
Muth, and Lucas. 
The  modern  economy  is  marked  by  the  feasibility  of  endogenous 
change. Modernization opens the door for individuals to engage in novel 
activity—most importantly,  the ﬁnancing,  developing,  and marketing of 
new products and methods. Furthermore, such innovations, when success­
ful in the marketplace, have unforeseen effects on production possibilities, 
prices, the differentiation of goods, and the specialization of work. 
The author is McVickar Professor of Political Economy at Columbia University; director of the Center 
on Capitalism and Society, Earth Institute, at Columbia University; and the winner of the 2006 Nobel 
Prize in Economics. 
xiii xiv  Foreword 
For decades, economics students have quietly asked themselves whether 
the equilibrium theory of the classroom is adequate for modeling the mod­
ern economy. It is one thing to know the prices at hand, another to know 
all prices far and wide and over the whole future and for every state of the 
world that shocks might land the economy in. Equilibrium theory implicitly 
takes the mechanisms that constitute the economy to be completely known: 
participants have a full understanding of how this organism works, so ev­
eryone knows the probability distribution of outcomes to expect in this or 
that state. This in turn implies that everyone knows this understanding to 
be common knowledge, so there is no diversity of views that would have to 
be guessed at in estimating what others intend to do. 
History records a small band of economists who have called attention 
to points of dissonance between the modern economy and equilibrium 
theory, including the theory of rational expectations equilibrium, in which 
expectations (and thus prices) are taken to be appropriate for equilibrium 
in each possible current state.1 In fact the growing perception, starting from 
the turn of the century, that the new modern economies were generally 
out of equilibrium, sometimes frighteningly so, is one of the hallmarks of 
twentieth-century thought. 
The great interwar theorist at Chicago, Frank Knight, pondering the 
arrival of capitalism, took the unprecedented position in his 1921 classic 
Risk, Uncertainty and Proﬁt  that virtually all business decisions other than 
the routine ones are to an appreciable extent a step into the unknown. 
The possible outcomes might have probabilities but those probabilities were 
unknown, or “unmeasurable”—the radical sort of uncertainty now called 
“Knightian uncertainty.” Viewing from London and Cambridge a similarly 
modern economy, John Maynard Keynes proposed in his 1921 Treatise on 
Probability a rewrite of probability theory that would take account of radical 
uncertainty. His 1936 General Theory was an attempt to overthrow equilib­
rium theory. In subsequent years, economists from Vienna to Copenhagen 
critiqued “perfect foresight” and its generalization, now known as rational 
expectations equilibrium.2 In the glorious 1960s several American econo­
mists broke from equilibrium theory.3 
1. I discuss some of the implications of this anti-equilibrium view for economic activity and 
inﬂation-unemployment tradeoffs in the context of my early expectations-driven macroeconomic 
models in my Nobel Prize lecture (Phelps, 2007). 
2. I am thinking of the game theorists Morgenstern (1949) and Zeuthen (1955). 
3. Ambiguity and vagueness were introduced by Ellsberg (1961) and Fellner (1961), personal 
knowledge by Polanyi (1958). Several applied papers followed in this spirit. For example,  in a 
macroeconomic context, Friedman (1961, p. 449) pointed out that long and variable lags in the 
effects of monetary policy imply that forecasting the consequences of monetary action is “not an easy 
requirement in the present state of our knowledge.” Phelps (1968a) argued that a (expectational) 
disequilibrium may be created by an undiagnosed structural shift. Foreword  xv 
Trained professionals  in  that  decade had  a  sense of  what  this anti-
equilibrium literature was getting at. We thought that, empirically, equilib­
rium theory would not work well. For one thing, the economies (at least the 
world economy) we lived in had become too rich for equilibrium theory to 
ﬁt at all well: forming correct expectations about a sole experiment, such 
as a lower price or a new variation on a product, is one thing, but forming 
expectations when most or all ﬁrms are simultaneously experimenting is 
qualitatively different. For another thing, these economies were not really 
ﬂuctuating around the stationary state or steady-growth path of neoclassical 
theory; they were constantly evolving in their structure and were chang­
ing too fast for economic relationships (between prices and quantities, for 
example) to have the durability that would be necessary for formation of 
accurate expectations about present and future data.4 
Yet, a few years later, the community of macroeconomists, far from dis­
tancing themselves farther and farther from equilibrium theory, proceeded 
almost unanimously to embrace the rational expectations models of busi­
ness activity introduced in the early 1970s. Keynes and the Cantabridgians 
were out. Hayek and the Austrians were out. So was Spiethoff and his Ger­
man school. 
This marvelous book by Frydman and Goldberg documents in its ﬁrst two 
chapters invaluable insights of the “early modern” theory of capitalism that 
were lost when the profession endorsed rational expectations equilibrium. 
And it exposes to the light the arguments offered by the advocates of the 
premise of rational expectations. There can’t be many readers who won’t be 
fascinated by this story. In letting the two sides speak in their own carefully 
chosen words the authors allow the expressed points of disagreement to 
come into sharp focus. 
These chapters, however, soon probe to a deeper level. It isn’t just that 
the postulate of rational expectations is unrealistic in the same way that the 
postulate of rational choice is conceded to be unrealistic. We agree to work 
with rational choice in spite of its limitations, so why not rational expecta­
tions too? The primary issue is not an empirical one. Even if no ﬁrms at the 
current time were actually venturing a new price list, conceiving a new way 
to cut costs, devising new ﬁnancial vehicles, contemplating a new product, 
and so forth, there would still be a problem: rational expectations equilib­
rium theory as an element of our models of the modern sort of economies 
contradicts the very essence of an economy in which economic actors are 
free to exercise their “creativity” by venturing to do something innovative. 
4. The former argument is the theme of Frydman (1982). The latter argument is the theme of 
a recent paper of mine (Phelps, 2006a). xvi  Foreword 
The authors argue that if we aspire to build models that apply to modern 
economies—economies whose central functioning is the manufacture of 
change through their innovative activity and their adoption and mastery of 
the innovations made available—it is contradictory to adopt the rational 
expectations postulate that whatever change takes place in the future is 
already knowable and known in the present: that the economic change to be 
experienced is in a sense predetermined. Yet contemporary model builders 
embracing rational expectations have been undeterred or unaware of the 
contradiction: they either specify that there is no change in the world (the 
world they would describe with their models) or that whatever process of 
change is going on in the world can be incorporated in their models in a 
fully predetermined way. 
This criticism is not a narrow point that would be straightforward to 
remedy. The authors are not referring to the fact that the archetypal models 
of an economy enjoying rational expectations equilibrium have built into 
them an invariant trend-growth path to which the economy is constantly 
returning (as described by some transition dynamics). It is obvious that 
such a trend path is predetermined; the possibilities and probabilities are 
“prespeciﬁed” (in the authors’ preferred term). The authors’ argument is 
broader than that. If a rational expectations model supposed instead that the 
future was governed by a probabilistic linear birth process, so the model has 
no trend path to which the economy is tethered, there is still a fundamental 
predeterminacy: the possible states at a given future date are all known 
already and there is at present a calculable probability, conditional on the 
present state, of each such future state’s occurrence. In this model too, 
then, there is implicitly no possibility for the actors in the economy to create 
something unforeseeable, surprising, genuinely innovative. Thus, there is a 
methodological choice: to model on the premise of fully prespeciﬁed future 
possibilities, which rational expectations requires, or to model an economy 
capable of endogenous change, which the modern economy is. 
A recent case in point is the state-of-the-art model of the real business cycle 
type, where recognition is given to the accepted idea that opportunities are 
rosier at some times than others—the notion of “regimes” in which there 
are outsize rates of return in prospect for investment.5 At ﬁrst blush this 
construct appears to capture an economy undergoing the occasional boom 
and the occasional slump at unpredictable times and having a future that 
feels not fully predetermined—and all this without sacriﬁcing the precision 
of  rational expectations equilibrium. The truth is,  however,  that this is 
5. See Beaudry and Portier (2004). Foreword  xvii 
a highly mechanical apparatus implying a ﬁnite number of states at any 
future date and imputing to each a calculable probability conditional on 
the economy’s present state. 
An  older  case  of  equilibrium  theory  in  macroeconomics  is  Joseph 
Schumpeter’s great 1911 work Theory of Economic Development. He saw the 
need to go beyond the Spiethoff-Cassel model, in which no entrepreneur 
appears and none is needed, only the occasional discovery of an exoge­
nous scientist or explorer. Forced to choose whether to remain with the 
equilibrium perspective of his idol Walras or instead to regard entrepre­
neurs as creators in their own—ﬁgures creating the future—Schumpeter 
clung to the equilibrium perspective. The Schumpeterian entrepreneurs 
were merely the vessels the economy needs to carry out the commercial 
innovations made possible by the technology. The stock of undeveloped 
innovations were all “in the air,” each waiting for one of Schumpeter’s “en­
trepreneurs” to ﬁnd it convenient to take on its ﬁnancing, developing, and 
marketing. The rate of return of every project was known, at any rate to 
the experienced banker. The Schumpeterian model makes determinate (at 
least probabilistically) the rate of innovative activity and the time path of 
productivity—as if the creativity is all science and no commerce. 
In contrast,  to elaborate on earlier remarks,  Keynes saw the rate of 
return as quite unknown and the demand for investment funds as driven 
by entrepreneurs’ “animal spirits.” Hayek saw that every participant has 
little or no knowledge of how the economy works as a whole, contrary to 
rational expectations;  that a participant is apt to have only some highly 
specialized knowledge about his or her industry, which is itself apt to be 
quite specialized; that in some cases it is so deep as to be “private knowledge”; 
and that such knowledge may permit a creative person to conceive some new 
business strategy or new business product that is not in the air, not already 
known by all. In the struggle between these two worldviews, Keynes and 
Hayek were right but did not carry the day.6 
As the rational expectations view has come under increasing suspicion, 
parts of the profession have jumped to the conclusion that the problem is 
“sticky” prices or some sort of rote behavior or “irrational exuberance” in 
asset prices or all of these. What Keynes and Hayek in the 1930s and Phelps 
in the 1960s understood is that there may be a problem with expectational 
equilibrium and it need not be sticky prices or irrationality but mainly the 
6. I would add that in relatively recent work (Phelps, 1994) I simply treat every shock as de 
novo, so the state it brings was fully unanticipated. Obviously this treatment is at odds with rational 
expectations. However, I regard the implications of that model to ﬁt more closely with the behavior 
of national economies than do the models that invoke a stochastic stationary state with no room for 
parametric shifts. xviii  Foreword 
ever-imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy and the attempt 
of purposeful market participants and policy makers to cope with it.7 
If rational expectations equilibrium and its doppelganger predeterminacy 
must be regarded as inapplicable to the modern economy, the profession 
needs to embark on its own voyage of discovery. The present book is devoted 
to setting out a fresh approach, one that is neither rational-expectationist 
nor behavioralist. 
The authors of this book show that if we want to do coherent macro­
economic theorizing about a modern economy we are going to have to allow 
in our models for non-routine decision making and unforeseeable changes 
in the social context within which individuals make decisions. How do we 
build such a theory for modern economies? 
The authors devote most of the book to developing such a theory, 
which they dub “imperfect knowledge economics.” This economics builds 
in mathematical microfoundations of aggregate outcomes and yet it allows 
for non-routine ways in which market participants might alter the way they 
deploy resources. The remarkable feature of these imperfect knowledge 
models is that, while they do not assume away non-routine activities, they 
nevertheless  generate  implications  that  allow  an  economist  to  compare 
empirically the performance of alternative explanations of outcomes. 
How is this done? The key point is that imperfect knowledge economics 
focuses on change and looks for qualitative regularities, not quantitative ones. 
The authors’ models impose qualitative restrictions on the way forecasting 
strategies are revised. While placing enough structure on an economist’s 
model, these restrictions are general enough to be compatible with a myriad 
of ways in which market participants might revise their views of the future. 
Moreover, these restrictions recognize that sharp forecasts of what an in­
dividual will do are beyond the reach of any economic analysis of modern 
economies. 
This approach resolves Knight’s and Keynes’s problem of how to recon­
cile the use of probability theory in modeling decisions under uncertainty. 
As Knight and Keynes recognized, neither the actors nor the economist-
modeler knows the probability distribution of outcomes. The key innovation 
of the authors is to model the change across time in these distributions and 
in a purely qualitative way (the authors refer to these as “partially predeter­
mining restrictions”) rather than to model the probability distribution at 
each point in time. 
7. Leijonhufvud (1968) also attributes this view to Keynes, and he identiﬁes himself with that 
view. I should add that, although I participated in the New Keynesian venture in the 1970s to rewrite 
Keynesian economy on the basis of rational expectations coupled with non-synchronous wage/price 
setting, my heart was always with the model in which wages and prices were continually being revised. Foreword  xix 
The three-decade-long debate between the neoclassical and “Keynes­
ian” schools over whether prices are sticky or ﬂexible appears to be a mere 
distraction. In the context of the foreign exchange market, the authors show 
that, with incomplete knowledge, long swings in real exchange rates do not 
depend on whether prices are sticky or ﬂexible. Rather, they arise from the 
imperfection of knowledge concerning the structure of the economy and 
market participants’ attempts to cope with it. Moreover, in contrast to re­
cently fashionable behavioral models, the authors’ explanation of swings 
does not abandon the long tradition in economics that individuals behave 
in largely rational, or reasonable, ways. 
Remarkably, once the authors allow for imperfect knowledge on how 
fundamentals inﬂuence the exchange rate, long swings can arise even if 
all market participants’ diverse forecasting strategies depend solely on the 
macroeconomic fundamentals. It would not be surprising, therefore, if it is 
later found that a similar mechanism generates swings in overall business 
activity. (This possibility suggests that if modiﬁed by the authors’ imperfect 
knowledge framework, my models of “structural slumps” would generate 
not a monotone shift from the initial steady state to the new one but rather 
a cyclical transition.) 
In the conventional conception, as I pointed out above, market out­
comes are mere vibration around a steady state path. Swings are viewed as 
anomalous and puzzling. Once imperfect knowledge is placed at the center 
of the analysis, swings arise as part of the discovery process of how prices are 
related to macroeconomic fundamentals. 
The authors’ imperfect knowledge economics sees the modern econ­
omy as possessing bounded instability around historical benchmark values, 
which themselves may be evolving over time. The importance of historical 
benchmarks in characterizing individual behavior and aggregate outcomes 
was emphasized by almost all important early modern economists: Wicksell, 
Keynes, and Tobin, who built on this in his work on “behavior toward risk.” 
(I imagine this view will be found to link well to my own work on movements 
of the medium-term natural unemployment rate.) 
Another hallmark of the imperfect knowledge view is its qualiﬁcation 
of ﬁxed policy rules. The necessary point is that the optimum rule is not 
the same from one structure of the economy to another. As with the rest 
of macroeconomics, the issues have to be rethought in a way that makes 
the ever-imperfect knowledge of market participants and policymakers an 
integral part of the analysis. 
I had the great good fortune in the 1960s to initiate the profession’s 
work on plausible microfoundations for macroeconomic modeling,  tak­
ing into account the knowledge and the information that the micro-actors 
couldreasonablybesupposedtohave—arevolutionarymovement, itseems. 
Unfortunately, the rational expectations models, appearing in the 1970s, xx  Foreword 
sidestepped  the  problem  of  expectations  formation  under  uncertainty 
by blithely supposing that the model’s actors (tellingly dubbed “agents”) 
knew the “correct” model and the correct model was the analyst’s model— 
whatever that model might be that day. The stampede toward “rational 
expectations”—widely thought to be a “revolution,” though it was only a 
generalization  of  the  neoclassical  idea  of  equilibrium—derailed  the 
expectations-driven model building that had just left the station. In the end, 
this way of modeling has not illuminated how the world economy works. 
Happily for me and, I believe, for the profession of economics, this deeply 
original and important book gives signs of bringing us back on track—on 
a road toward an economics possessing a genuine microfoundation and at 
the same time a capacity to illuminate some of the many aspects of the mod­
ern economy that the rational expectations approach cannot by its nature 
explain. 